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1. Introduction  
Nowadays, every manufacturing enterprise, company providing services or transport wants 
to be successful. Its goal is to secure prosperity of business and to achieve it through 
manufacturing or services. The technological processes and equipment are closely linked 
with the industrial risks which have become the object of assessing their decrease on the 
acceptable level and last but not least permanent monitoring of risks from the side of 
enterprises as well as selected bodies of the public administration. Perception and 
awareness of the need to prevent rising the crisis phenomena is for the society as well as 
legal entities or natural persons very important. Overlooking and insufficient attention paid 
to the risks could have negative impacts for all people. An important part of the risk 
assessment process is also inspecting and monitoring the adopted measures in connection 
with the effort to decrease their number. 
As it was mentioned the risks connected with the technical and technological processes can 
be a source of unplanned interruption of the manufacturing processes or can violate 
providing a service and can cause material losses, damage the environment, threaten the 
health and lives of people. They can endanger not only the participating employees but also 
inhabitants from the surroundings and in the case of a leakage of dangerous substances it 
can become the source of violating the nature, the environment and endangering the 
inhabitants for a long-time period, if not forever. In the time period of increasing demands 
on the security of the technological processes the prevention is becoming the dominant idea 
and this article deals just with this area. It characterises the selected areas of prevention of 
industrial accidents which are the basic assumption for securing the safety of the industrial 
processes.  
One of the objectives of this article is to show a possible approach to assessing the risks of the 
industrial processes in the form of structured diagrams. The logical procedure coincides with 
the currently used procedures created on the EU level as well as the national structures. Our 
attention will be aimed at especially at the area of the industrial accidents and the process of 
the risk assessment of the industrial processes in the Slovak Republic.  
The uncertainty and its influence is significant in the process of the risk assessment and it is 
valid especially when assessing the risk from the quantitative point of view. The variance of 
the results is caused especially by different approaches to assessing and presenting the risk. 
www.intechopen.com
 
Nuclear Power – Control, Reliability and Human Factors 
 
408 
However, an extensive investigation of uncertainty is missing here. In the next part of the 
article I will deal with the influence of the uncertainty in assessing the risks and I will show 
the main sources of its presence. Several investigations have been realised worldwide which 
are to find out the main sources of the uncertainty influence when assessing the risks. 
(Amendola et al., 2002) 
The last part of this article deals with the main cause of rising the industrial accidents, 
namely with people – the human factor.  The human factor operates in an interaction with 
the industrial accidents and plays an important role in their rise; however, it is affected 
also by the consequences of their demonstrations. Here we can mention its three 
positions. The first one is the often analysed position of people as the human error that is 
the main cause of developing the industrial accidents. James Reason (1990) analyses it 
thoroughly in his book “Human Error”. In his next book “Human Contribution” he 
describes also another position of the human factor – the hero who is able to prevent the 
rise of the industrial accidents. It is just the position of the human factor whose causes and 
characteristic features are not investigated in depth and therefore there is the space for 
further research. Last but not least they are the people – the human factor who is affected 
by the rise of the industrial accidents and which puts them to a position of a victim. The 
victims can be the so called direct victims (dead, injured people…) and indirect ones (the 
families of the missing or dead people).  
2. Risk assessment in industrial accident prevention 
The effort of people to achieve higher and higher standard of living reflects in the dynamic 
development of technologies, which are, on the other hand, still more and more complicated 
and can lead to the industrial accidents. The industrial accidents as the explosion in 
Flixborough (1974) or in Seveso (1976) as well as the disaster of the firm Union Carbide in 
Bhopal (1984) or in Chernobyl (1986) as also a whole range of others have shown the failure 
of the technology, its attendance. Due to these failures a great number of people died, or the 
consequences of these accidents caused durable health damage, not to speak about the 
losses of the material values and environment which can be of a long-term character or even 
irreversible.  
The aim of the first part of this chapter is to describe the environment of the industrial 
accidents in the EU and in the Slovak Republic and to show an algorithm for assessing the 
risks through structured diagrams which should be mainly used in Slovak Republic. The 
model created complies with the currently valid legal regulations in the area of prevention 
against industrial accidents and is in balance with the used procedures for practical risk 
assessment in Slovakia as well as the EU. 
Industrial accidents in the context of the EU and the Slovak Republic  
The company SWISS RE works out an annual overview and summary of natural disasters 
and anthropogeneous disasters (man-made disasters) according to selected criteria (see the 
note). For working out an overview I decided to use selected indicators from 1998 to 2008 
and to create the table 1 which depicts an overview of technological disasters in a chosen 
time period and is divided in three groups. The main group is created by the 
anthropogeneous disasters where belong all technological disasters caused by people and 
are designated in the table and the graphs as MMD (man-made disasters). This group 
comprises explosions, fires, air disasters, naval disasters, road and railway disasters, 
collapse of buildings and bridges, mining disasters and terrorism. The anthropogeneous 
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disasters where an explosion or fire arose or their combination create the second group and 
are designated as FED (fire and explosion disasters). There are disasters occurring in the 
industrial plants and warehouses, manufacturing processes working with petrol and gas, 
hotels and other buildings as well as remaining fires and explosions. The last group is 
created by accidents where an explosion, fire or leakage of hazardous substances in the 
industrial environment arose (factories and warehouses) are designated as ID (industrial 
disasters). In the table which is transformed into graphs I depict all three groups from the 
point of view of the overall number of the technological disasters, the number of victims and 
financial losses (million USD) during the time period of 1998 – 2008.  
 
  Number of events     Number of victims Financial losses (mil. USD) 
YEARS MMD FED ID MMD FED ID MMD FED ID 
1998 219 34 19 9788 1445 94 3534 1454 835 
1999 188 36 20 7238 723 189 4140,3 2551 2107,7 
2000 230 34 20 9694 1368 349 3049 1334 773 
2001 204 40 17 10247 921 371 24381 3748 2086 
2002 214 27 14 13066 2111 1562 2130 935 915 
2003 238 36 15 7914 1071 139 2320 1137 905 
2004 216 44 15 7275 1330 47 2889 1713 887 
2005 248 60 31 8935 692 162 5066 4095 2346 
2006 213 42 21 8677 906 185 4043 2110 1722 
2007 193 34 15 6923 611 163 4295 2145 1170 
2008 174 45 24 5618 454 159 7812 5255 2146 
Total 2337 432 211 95375 11632 3420 63659,3 26477 15892,7 
(Source: Swiss Re, 1998 – 2008) 
Note: The company SWISS RE understands a disaster as an event when at least 20 people lose their lives, or the 
total amount of damages represents the sum of 72 million USD or the damages on property exceed 36 million 
USD 
Table 1. Overview of selected anthropogeneous disasters according to number of events, 
number of victims and financial losses   
The table shows that the disasters in the industrial environment create a relatively great 
part of the anthropogeneous disasters especially from the point of view of their number 
and financial losses. Their impacts on the employees and inhabitants from this point of 
view are not negligible which is proved by the numbers of victims in the individual 
categories. The financial losses caused by the largest disasters in the industrial 
environment create a relatively great proportion of the anthropogeneous disasters in the 
individual years.   
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Seveso II directive 
The growth of the number of industrial disasters is the reason why new methods rise or the 
old ones are modified, i.e. the so called systematic procedures are developed which attempt 
to increase the security in the industrial enterprises. An example is the implementation of 
the SEVESO II directive in the framework of the EU as the basic pillar of preventing serious 
industrial disasters in the member states. Forming the directive began after the 
consequences of the large industrial disasters in the 1970s and 1980s when the EU in 1982 
adopted a directive on serious industrial disasters. The EU called this first document 
“SEVESO Directive” – it got its name after the Italian town Seveso where after an explosion 
in a chemical factory dioxin leaked and caused a mass intoxication of the inhabitants. The 
prevention of the serious industrial disasters was later adapted by the Council Directive 
96/82/EC on the control of major-accident hazards involving dangerous substances also 
called “SEVESO II” which is aimed not only at the prevention of large disasters but also at 
reducing their consequences for people and the environment.  
Due to serious industrial disasters (breaking the dam of the sludge bed in the Rumanian 
town Baia Mare which caused intoxicating the river Tisza, the explosion of the 
pyrotechnics factory in the Dutch town Enschede, the explosion in the factory for 
producing fertilisers in the French town Touluse) a requirement for updating this 
directive arose. In 2003 the Council Directive 2003/102/EC was adopted. It formulates the 
environmental objectives of the EU as well as the decisive procedures in adopting 
measures for achieving these goals. The objects of this legal adaptation are specific duties 
of the operators and corresponding bodies concerning the enterprises where the selected 
hazardous chemical substances can be found. These issues are solved from the view of 
supervising the risk management of the possible serious industrial disasters. This law 
concerns companies of heavy chemistry, firms dealing with pressurised gases, equipment 
working with a higher amount of ammonia (firms using refrigerating equipment), 
petrochemical operations, but also companies with a higher supply of oil substances, etc. 
It does not concern the military premises, transport of hazardous substance by pipelines, 
mining activities, garbage dumps, etc.   
EU study in the area of serious industrial disaster prevention  
In 2008 the EU – Vri (The European Virtual Institute for Integrated Risk Management) 
realised a questionnaire study whose aim was to acquire information about the 
transposition of the requirements concerning the SEVESO II Directive in the individual 
member states and its general procedure, practical experience with making use of the 
weaknesses and problems connected with its practical implementation, effectiveness of its 
implementation and the impacts of the directive on the competitiveness of the European 
industry and subsequently to respond to these comments (to improve the directive). The 
target industrial sectors for processing the questionnaire were as follows: production of 
metals, explosives, petrochemistry, pesticides, pharmaceutical industry, basic chemical 
production, plastics and rubber, production of energy and its distribution, food industry 
and beverages. The questionnaire assessment brought conclusions and lessons necessary for 
a partial updating of the directive and preparing new accompanying documents. The 
selected conclusions from the research realised are as follows:  
 the respondents have recognised a possibility to work out next accompanying 
documents in some areas – the area with the highest priority is the analysing and 
assessing the risks (risk assessment), 
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 a problematic area is the non-universality of the approach of the risk assessment, 
insufficient criteria for quantifying the risk and methods, tools and data for 
implementing these procedures, 
 a lot of enterprises work out more a qualitative rather than a quantitative analysis 
which can conceal a higher level of the result uncertainty,  
 the procedure for the risk assessment according to the SEVESO II Directive should be 
harmonised with the legal standards for the given area in the given country. /SALVI, 
O. et al 
Similarly the responsible bodies in the area of serious industrial disaster prevention 
recommend proposing and creating the European database for supporting the risk 
assessment and working out the other documents. There exist some “guaranteed practices” 
for working out the analysis and risk assessment, however, in general it is necessary to 
create a clear and understandable procedure for processing documents and most 
respondents are missing such a document.   
If new accompanying documents are created, the following issued should not be forgotten: 
 the criteria of risk acceptability (impacts and probability), 
 the assessment of the security measure management, 
 the assessment of emergency planning, 
 the calculation of the dangerous events´ consequences (explosion, fire, spreading a toxic 
substance),  
 the methodology taking into account prevention and protecting measures, 
 the methodology for assessing the domino effects. 
The final EU recommendations in the area of the questionnaire assessment head to two 
levels: 
 creating an accompanying document which will deal with what is to be done step by 
step and will explain how the directive requirements are to be interpreted, 
 creating manuals for individual industrial sectors which would specify the environment 
for risk analyses and procedures necessary for its processing (SMEs).    
Existing procedures for risk assessment  
The environment of preventing the industrial disasters in the EU member states is affected 
by obligations which result for them from the membership in the international 
organisations. The individual EU countries implement the directives in their legal guidelines 
and create new procedures for the risk assessment which should contribute to harmonising 
in the area of the industrial disaster prevention.  
There are several procedures for assessing the risks of the industrial processes. Systematic 
procedures, methods and techniques are used. The systematic procedures are structured 
operations which utilise selected methods and techniques in the individual steps. In the 
Slovak Republic the risk assessment also fulfils the requirements of the laws introduced in 
the Figure 1.  
The risk assessment is part of the risk management. Its activity as well as expending 
resources for preventing the rise of serious industrial disasters is often pushed to 
background both by the wide lay public and professionals during a time period when no 
crisis phenomenon arises. However, when any technological disaster occurs, e.g. the 
accident which happened on 27th October 1995 in VSŽ, a.s. Košice – the leakage of CO, on 
2nd March 2007 in Nováky - the explosion of the delaboration hall – both of them in Slovakia, 
then the losses of lives as well as material prove that a lot of tasks in this area are fulfilled 
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only in a formal way, their complex securing from the organisational, personnel, technical as 
well as material point of view is not solved. However, fulfilling these tasks is to be mutually 
harmonised and it is necessary to ensure them on a corresponding level.  
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Selected legal guidelines in the area of preventing the industrial disasters which 
require the risk assessment   
Prevention in risk assessment 
To avoid the industrial disasters, it is necessary to deal with prevention which is part of the 
crisis management model (prevention – preparedness – response – recovery). We utilise 
several procedures in the area of prevention whose main goal is to reduce the probability of 
the rise of the crisis phenomena or their negative impacts. One of these tools or more or less 
idea procedures or philosophy is the risk management, i.e. the process which is utilised not 
only on the microeconomic but also on the macroeconomic and global levels. Its procedures, 
methods and techniques contribute to reducing the probability of rising crisis phenomena 
and reducing their negative impacts which plays a positive role for the object assessed. It is 
implemented in different spheres of the social life and is applied in various forms in the 
practice. A consequent implementation of the risk management requires not only realising a 
thorough identification, analysis and risking assessment, their minimising by suitable 
procedures, but also a regular inspection of the measures realised.   
In the Slovak Republic in the area of risk management the standard STN 01 0380 Risk 
Management is used, however, it has become outdated in several directions and the professional 
circles criticise it. If we wanted to identify the decisive phases of risk management we could 
realise it according to the standard ISO 31 000 Risk Management Guidance Standard. According 
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to it the process of risk management consists of the parts depicted in the figure 2. The risk 
assessment (outlined by an interrupted line in the figure 2) in this standard includes creating 
linkages, identifying the risk sources, risk analysis and evaluating the risk (risk estimation).  
 
 
Source: ISO 31 000, 2009 – adapted. 
Fig. 2. Risk management according to the standard ISO 31 000 
The individual phases are in the accessible sources, legal norms and regulations, 
methodological manuals frequently introduced in different ways and this fact can cause 
misunderstandings in communication in the given area (a problem is often caused by a 
translation from a foreign language).  
The risk assessment should be based on a systematic identification of the risk sources, on 
detecting what can be damaged, on creating scenarios in the form of trees of knowledge, 
trees of failures, and assessing the probabilities and their consequences. Expressing the risk 
should always comply with the mathematical formulation and represents a product of the 
probability and consequences. The consequences are determined in continuation to the rate 
of the threatened activities through calculations, and the probability either by a qualified 
estimation, or based on the historical experience. Quantitative risk analysis has its unique 
place in determining the level of adequacy of the security measures in the area of industrial 
process security. The quantitative criteria are, from the point of view of the level of 
subjectivity which enters the process, more credible than the qualitative ones.  
Risk assessment is the core of risk management. After its realisation, the corrective measures 
for carrying out the stabilisation of the system and decreasing the risks can be stated. Both 
phases are burdened by subjective as well as objective factors which affect their overall 
result (uncertainty). The objective factors comprise defining the real quantities when 
assessing the risk quantitatively. In practice it is a problem to define the probability and 
consequences of an undesirable phenomenon because often the relevant data required for 
stating the risk is missing.   
Existing procedures, methods and techniques for risk assessment  
Assessing the risks in the industrial processes and their decreasing has a whole range of 
specifics whose recognising and accepting is very important for improving the level of the 
safety of the whole society and its continual progress. There are lots of models and methods 
for assessing the risks, however, most of them use a special terminology and specify the 
same facts in a different way.  
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In Slovak Republic there should be used these types of systematic approaches:  
 PRA (Probabilistic risk analysis)  
 ARAMIS (Accidental Risk Assessment Methodology for Industries) 
 MOSAR and others  
PRA is also called quantitative risk analysis (QRA) or probabilistic safety analysis (PSA) is 
widely applied to many sectors. In many of these areas PRA techniques have been adopted as 
a part of the regulatory framework by relevant authorities (so do in the Slovak Republic). In 
other areas the analysis PRA methodology is increasingly applied to validate claims for safety 
or to demonstrate the need for the further improvement. The trend in all areas is for PRA to 
support tools for management decision making, forming the new area of risk assessment. In 
the Slovak Republic the approach is worked out in the document “Methodological Procedure 
for Risk Assessment of Hazardous Operations and Study of Companies in the Slovak 
Republic” (Ministry of Environment of the Slovak Republic, Bratislava, 2000). The document 
shows the advantages of implementing the PRA (probabilistic risk analysis) compared to other 
methodologies as well as its broad implementation. The usage of induction and deduction 
methods described by it is emphasised.  Next systematic approach is MOSAR which is a 
relatively new, systematic approach for analysing technical and technological risks developed 
in France. It can be used for analysing both a new and existing system. Two of its basic 
modules are known, namely Module A and Module B. The principle consists in realising a 
double analysis. In the first step the macroscopic view is searching for risks created by 
transmitting a danger (the so called risks of proximity) and this is solved by the Module A. In 
the second step the risks of individual sources are analysed, here we make use of the so called 
classical methods of the risk analyses (Module B). In the framework of the first step, i.e. the 
macroscopic view the so called black-boxes are used. The key when we use them is a 
simplified view at the considered system depicted as the black-box. The inputs are entered and 
concrete outputs are picked up. The way from the input to the system to the output from it is 
not determined in a greater detail.  
The European approach ARAMIS is a less utilised method. It serves for the risk assessment in 
the industry and combines the strengths of determinism and acknowledged objective 
regularities. Its aim is to create a unified procedure for the risk assessment in all companies 
which belong to the group which has to fulfil the SEVESO II Directive with the possibility of the 
mutual comparison of the “companies´ danger rate” regardless to the fact to which industrial 
sector they belong. This methodology was optimised for the gas industry, specifically for the 
company NAFTA, a.s. The methodology’s output is to determine the risk rate, suggesting 
suitable measures with a subsequent investment aim of the company in the area of increasing 
the operation security. The systematic procedure ARAMIS is recommended for implementation 
in the Slovak Republic. Currently only few companies in Slovakia use it for working out the risk 
assessment. A thorough depiction of the method is shown in the figure 3.  
The following types of analyses affect the selection of the methods and procedures of the 
risk assessment in an industrial environment: 
 the a priori analysis is based on the phenomenon which is the source of the risk and has 
occurred in the past at least once. The nature of the object assessed, the probable 
behaviour of the phenomenon is known and thus we can a priori forecast its behaviour 
and properties in the future; 
 the a posteriori analysis is used when the analyst has to work with information, 
phenomena and events about which he/she thinks can develop, although they have not 
happened in the past. It means that the risk is estimated based on the assumed 
behaviour of the phenomena which develop after the analysis. 
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Fig. 3. Systematic approach ARAMIS (ARAMIS final user guide) 
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From the point of view of the inputs used and their character we distinguish: 
 the qualitative analysis – is used for the qualitative estimation of the risk of a certain 
event, i.e. non-digital description consisting of identification and description of the risk 
sources, the relative verbal evaluation of the seriousness of the risk sources, 
identification, setting up and describing the accident scenarios; 
 the semi-quantitative analysis – makes use of the semi-quantitative estimation of the risk 
of a certain event, i.e. the category of frequencies and effects and certain levels of 
seriousness are determined both verbally and quantitatively for the scenarios. The risk 
is  stated similarly as in the qualitative risk analysis, however, the category of 
seriousness of the effects and scenario frequency are rendered more precisely; 
 the quantitative analysis – a systematic procedure of numerical quantification of the 
expected number and effects of the potential accidents connected with the equipment or 
operation based on an engineering estimation, assessment and mathematical methods. 
(Paleček et al., 2000)  
The decision about selecting the qualitative, semi-quantitative or quantitative analysis 
depends especially on the depths of the study and the purpose of the analysis realised. 
The approach to the analysis from the point of view of stating the consequences and 
probabilities can be as follows: 
 the deterministic approach – can be used if the problem formulated by one question or 
several questions can be answered clearly and understandably by one answer. The 
analysis itself is connected with a relatively simple determining of the causes, effects 
and impacts (by the relationships among them). We assume in the case of each problem 
it will have one result or one possible solution. It can happen that this approach does 
not result in any solution, i.e. there is no answer to the given question, or it cannot be 
answered. In this case only an approximate result is achieved. The uncertainty is not 
connected with a probabilistic result and is not easily detectable. When the effects 
which can develop are defined correctly we sometimes recognise the probability in the 
form of 100 % of the probabilistic occurrence or 0 % of the probabilistic occurrence (i.e. 
the phenomenon either develops or it does not);  
 the probabilistic approach – is based on an assumption that several possible results of 
one assessed problem (situation) can develop. Probabilistic modelling aims at 
studying several results from the given data. The input data itself for the 
deterministic model cannot be used for a probabilistic study of the same problem. 
The probabilistic approach is currently preferred more. It is also recommended in the 
Slovak Republic for processing the analysis and risk assessment in the area of serious 
industrial accidents. 
Model for assessing risks of industrial processes  
Based on the previous information in the further text I characterise analyses affect the 
selection of the methods and procedures of the risk assessment. The subjects of 
investigating the model for the risk assessment are especially the technological processes 
in the industrial environment utilising hazardous substances. The systematic procedure 
created can form a supporting apparatus for analyses, especially in the SMEs. It is 
similarly usable for the analysis in the process of managing continuity in the operational 
company processes (the business continuity management) whose mission is to ensure the 
operation of all important processes inside the organisation if any unexpected events 
occur.  
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A systematic procedure serves the processors of the risk assessment of the technological 
processes with the presence of a hazardous substance for a better orientation in the given 
area as well as for approximating the fulfilment of the individual phases and will make the 
selection of methods and techniques for their application in the individual steps easier. The 
creation of a logical sequence of the phases and their steps according to which the analyst 
should proceed are emphasised. The phases of the risk assessment can be depicted by a 
simplified model which shows the involvement of the analysts, the responsible manager 
(decision-maker) and the working team to the overall process. The figure 4 shows the basic 
structure of the model of the risk assessment.  
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. Basic structure of the model of risk assessment 
Further text explains the individual phases of the simplified model. As the first one, the 
preparatory phase of the risk assessment is characterised whose realisation is often 
underestimated or is not carried out correctly. The process of the risk assessment is 
implemented in the realisation phase and then the assessment of risk acceptability 
continues. Decreasing the risks is a decision which is realised on the basis of identifying 
unacceptable risks and subsequent work with them.  
Preparatory phase of risk assessment 
The preparatory phase of the risk assessment is followed by its implementation phase. In 
this part the risk analyst and the working group (if the decision is being made the presence 
of a responsible company manager is also necessary) are the most important players. The 
figure 5 depicts preparatory phase of risk assessment. 
The figure 6 depicts the individual steps which create the realisation part of the risk 
assessment. Their interpretation as well as the content can differ in dependence on the 
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resources and type of the environment investigated as well as on the systematic approach 
used.  
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5. Preparatory phase 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 6. Steps of implementation phase of risk assessment 
Assessment of risk acceptability 
The phase of stating the risk acceptability is important from the point of view of their 
further control. In most cases the criteria of acceptability are stated already in the 
preparatory phase of the risk assessment.  
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following levels: 
CREATING A WORKING GROUP
STATING THE SERIOUISNESS OF RISK SOURCES AND 
SCENARIOS AND LEVEL OF RISK ACCEPTABILITY  
DESCRIPTION OF ANALYSED SYSTEM, OBJECT, 
EQUIPMENT AND DEFINING ITS BOUNDARY   
SELECTION OF SYSTEMATIC APPROACH FOR  
ANALYSIS  
QUALITATIVE 
ANALYSIS 
SEMI-QUANTITATIVE 
ANALYSIS 
QUANTITAIVE 
ANALYSIS 
STATING THE GOAL, EXTENT AND OBJECT OF  
REALISING THE ANALYSIS 
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 the negligible (acceptable) level of the risk – it represent a socially acceptable level of the 
risk in which the probability of occurrence of an adverse effect is small, the effects of its 
operation are moderate and the profit from the situation (the real or perceived one) is 
that large that the persons, groups or the whole society is willing to take the risk. It 
means that this level of risk does not require any regulation or other measures for its 
decrease neither from the point of view of people’s health nor the protection of other 
live systems;  
 the unacceptable level of the risk – requires inevitable taking of regulation measures or 
other specific measures for its decrease.  
Every individual as well as every society has own values for the risk acceptability which are 
a compromise in many cases or sometimes a consensus reflecting its real “cultural”, 
technological or operational maturity – in the technical practice often designated as the 
culture of operation. However, the term culture of operation comprises much more than the 
personal and technological security. It involves except for other things also the overall 
philosophy and approach of an individual or society to understanding the needs of the 
society.  
3. Uncertainty in risk assessment 
The second part of book chapter will talk about the uncertainty in risk assessment. It is 
known that results of any risk assessment are inevitably uncertain to some degree. Because 
of inevitable limitations of the risk assessment approach it must be acknowledged that the 
true risks could be higher or lower than estimated. In general, the word ‘uncertainty’ means 
that a number of different values can exist for a quantity, and ‘risk’ means the possibility of 
loss or gain as a result of uncertainties. The uncertainty should be divided into two 
categories: aleatory and epistemic. Aleatory stochastic uncertainty or due to randomness 
should result from bad knowledge of risk figures and their distribution, quantities such a 
failure rates, meteorological conditions at the time of release. Epistemic (reducible) is related 
to incomplete knowledge about phenomena of concern and inadequate matching available 
databases to the case under the assessment.  
Besides, we know also the so called operational uncertainty. When comparing the physical 
models, the experience shows the importance of the human factor, e.g. using the same 
computer code by several specialists can lead to variations. The estimation variability of the 
commonly defined “representatives” of values expressing the risk and complexity of 
dangerous and main/temporary events which were identified by various experts from the 
teams, reflects the types of uncertainty, both operational and epistemic ones.  If the values 
are defined as the “point assessment”, in this case the variability is tied to an aleatory 
uncertainty. A different point assessment can be assumed for the main events or the 
parameters can be selected by an equal division.   
Benchmark studies 
EC´s Joint Research Centre in Ispra and RisØ National Laboratory were coordinators of 
projects that showed the acute presence of uncertainty when carrying out the risk 
assessments and emphasised the resources the uncertainty stems from and also the fact how 
it can decisively affect the final result of the analysis. In the first comparison study 7 teams 
carried out the risk analysis in a chemical factory at an undetermined place in Europe. Their 
results in spite of equal input data mutually differed which was caused especially by 
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utilising different methods and approaches. It was detected in the risk identification phase 
that the scenario assessment by probabilistic and deterministic approach can lead to fully 
different conclusions. The comparison study consisted of five main phases: the 
documentation phase, three working phases and the assessment (enlarging) phase. The 
working phases include the qualitative and quantitative phase – through study of the 
technological process mechanisms through case studies. The uncertainty is in this case 
bound to a lot of components, inspection mechanisms which are used in the technological 
process and interactions between them and the human factor. On the other hand we count 
on an uncertainty which is linked with meteorological and environmental conditions. The 
table 2 shows an example of a difference when stating uncertainties (6th team chose 
deterministic approach).   
 
 
S Team 1 Team 2 Team 3 Team 4 Team 5 Team 7 
Size 
Deviations 
1 79.10  61.10  31, 4.10  79.10  61.10  71, 8.10  7 51, 8.10 1, 4.10   
2 51.10  63.10  51, 4.10  79.10  77, 3.10  74, 6.10  7 57, 3.10 1, 4.10   
3 44, 8.10 64, 8.10  38.10  75.10  75, 4.10  51, 3.10  6 34, 8.10 8.10   
4 61.10  –––––– 64, 6.10  79.10  78.10  61, 8.10  7 68.10 4, 6.10   
5 72, 8.10 81.10  35, 7.10  ––––– 62, 3.10  64, 9.10  10 56, 4.10 5, 7.10   
6 75.10  81.10  84.10  ––––– 85.10  75.10  8 71.10 5.10   
7 76.10  61.10  65.10  79.10  74.10  74.10  7 64.10 6.10   
8 61.10  75.10  61.10  74, 5.10  51, 3.10  74.10  7 54, 5.10 1, 3.10   
9 63.10  73, 4.10  51, 5.10  79.10  62, 2.10  78.10  7 53, 4.10 1, 5.10   
10 62, 4.10 71, 5.10  32, 1.10  62, 7.10  66.10  75.10  7 31, 5.10 2, 1.10   
11 95, 5.10 91, 5.10  71, 2.10  71, 2.10  64, 7.10  71, 4.10  9 61, 5.10 4, 7.10   
Table 2. Probability of „top events“ of the individual 7 teams´ scenarios (Amendola, 2002) 
The whole afore-mentioned procedure of assessing the consequences is full of uncertainties. 
In general we can thus say that there are two types of uncertainties: the uncertainty due to 
an incidental nature of the phenomena and uncertainties due to imperfect knowledge. The 
first type takes into account some phenomena and variables which incidentally change with 
time. The meteorological conditions can be such an example; it is impossible to determine 
with a 100 % certainty to forecast the direction and speed of the wind at a certain place of 
the space and at a certain time in the future, even if we knew exactly the conditions at 
present and in the past as well. The second type considers the lack of information which is 
presents at almost each step of the analysis. Our knowledge of phenomena following an 
unexpected leakage is not perfect and usually is based on empirical rules and observations 
of a limited number of accidents. The input parameters are also uncertain because exact 
conditions of accidents cannot be defined in advance. For an analyst to be able to cope with 
these uncertainties and insufficient knowledge, he/she usually has to state broad 
assumptions and to implement subjective judgement, i.e. an additional source of uncertainty 
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into the whole procedure. The result is then characterised as an output of assessing the 
consequences with the occurrence of a whole range of uncertainties. The analysts and the 
decision-making segment should be aware of these uncertainties connected with the results 
of the risk assessment and to take them into account in the case of the risk-oriented 
decisions. Some uncertainty sources can serve as an example: 
 the meteorological conditions, 
 the conditions in the closed equipment (e.g. pressure, the state of the substance, the 
quantity of the substance in the vessel at the time of damage), 
 the size and dimension of the opening, 
 the proportion of the removed liquid, 
 the drops in the material that leaked, 
 the presence of an initiation resource and the exact initiation time, 
 the behaviour of the flying ruins, 
 the vulnerability of the persons and buildings, etc. (Paleček, 2000)  
One of the methods how the uncertainty can be reduced is the repeating of the calculations 
for all possible combinations of uncertain input values and all possible changes of the used 
models and to assign them the individual uncertainties. However, this results in rising of an 
unbelievable large number of scenarios. In this case we can orient on a few important 
variables, or to choose some representative categories, we pay attention to calculating a 
significant expected frequency, as well as a great number of scenarios can be analysed and 
assessed or in the end the Monte Carlo simulation can be implemented. In the framework of 
the uncertain variables in assessing the risks the main attention should be paid especially to 
the correlation among them.  
 
 
 
 
N- uncertainties, E- error 
Fig. 7. Cumulating  of uncertainties in phases of risk assessment 
N1+N2+N3+Nč+E1+E2+E3+E4 
N1+N2+N3+E1+E2+E3 
N1+ N2+ E1+E2 
N1+E1 
PREPARATORY 
PHASE OF RISK 
ASSESSMENT 
 
IDENTIFYING 
RISK SOURCES 
SCENARIOS OF 
SELECTED 
RISK SOURCES
SELECTING 
REPRESENTATIVE 
SCENARIOS
EXPRESSING 
THE RISK 
(PxC) 
www.intechopen.com
 
Nuclear Power – Control, Reliability and Human Factors 
 
422 
On the figure 7 there is shown gradualness of risk analysis where in each phase there are 
partial uncertainty and partial error increasing to the final N and final E. Each phase is 
characterized by its own uncertainty and errors and input uncertainty and errors from 
previous phase. Finally we need to count not just with results of risk analysis but also 
estimate an uncertainty related to final figure.   
As a part of it, risk assessment is inevitably uncertain to some degree. And there is  
a question how issues of uncertainty are dealt with in existing safety regulations and  
in existing standards for risk analysis and management. I want to point on fact that there is  
a big need to deal with uncertainty and to count with it in risk assessment. Benchmark 
studies could serve as a guide to areas where caution must be taken when performing risk 
analysis. 
4. Human factor influence on accident occurrence and demonstration 
The last part will point out the problem which is very important to talk about. This is also 
the crucial part of crisis events occurrence and arising – the human factor. The aim of this 
part will be to show the human factor and his contribution to crisis events occurrence. The 
human factor will be assessed from two points of view as a hazard component  which cause 
industrial accidents occurrence by errors and human as a hero element whose adaptations 
and compensations have brought troubled systems back from the bring of disaster.  
In the past models of accidents dealing with the causes and relationships of accident rise 
were created. They insubstantially emphasized the human factor, it was only introduced as 
an immediate cause of events leading to an accident. Currently there is an effort to 
understand why and when the human factor affects the rise and development of serious 
accidents (it is the cause or part of accidents). What makes it possible to forecast, to prevent 
accidents as well as to decrease the share of the human factor on the rise and development 
of serious disasters? (Feyer, 2010) 
The analysis of events which occurred and were caused by the human factor is one of the 
methods for creating the preventive measures. According to this method it is possible to 
foresee partially the human behavior in the crisis situations.   
Over the past 50 years has been a dramatic widening of the scope of accidents investigation 
across many different hazardous domains:  
 system and cultural issues (1960s Metal fatigue, Aberfan Inbrox) 
 unsafe acts (errors and violations) (1970s Flixbourgh, Seveso, Tenerife TMI MT Erebus) 
 equipment failures (hardware – software) (1980s Chernobyl Zeebrugge Bhopal 
PiperAlpha Dryden, 1990s Paddington Long Island Alabama Eschede, 2000s Linate 
Uberlingen Columbia). (Holla &Moricova, 2010) 
Chemical incident statistics are very sketchy with respect to root causes and many reported 
incidents do not furnish much detail about the cause. Chemical safety and hazard 
investigation board published in 600K Report that: 
 Among cases where the cause was known, 49% were as a result of mechanical factors,  
39% from human factors and just 2% to weather-related phenomena, 10% causes not 
found, 
 Among cases involving mechanical factors, an overwhelming 97% were attributed to 
general equipment failure; 63% of human factors cases were attributed to human error. 
(Garcia, 2002) 
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The high rate of general equipment failure among reported incidents suggests that 
mechanical integrity/maintenance issues are significant and from the human error that 
training and proper procedures should also be examined.  
There should be introduced instances of accidents which were caused by failing the human 
factor or saving lives by human factor. The first of them is the Chernobyl disaster. An 
industrial accident of exceptional size had a lot of victims that cannot be counted exactly 
(the epidemiological analysis is not available). Various scientific studies assume from 9,000 
to 475, 000 victims. The most frequent conclusions and maybe the most probable values are 
in several tens of thousands (30,000 to 60,000). The 1986 Summary Report on the Post-
Accident Review Meeting on the Chernobyl Accident (INSAG-1) of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency's (IAEA's) International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group accepted the view 
of the Soviet experts that "the accident was caused by a remarkable range of human errors 
and violations of operating rules in combination with specific reactor features which 
compounded and amplified the effects of the errors and led to the reactivity excursion." In 
particular, according to the INSAG-1 report: "The operators deliberately and in violation of 
rules withdrew most control and safety rods from the core and switched off some important 
safety systems."  
Another example of the human factor failure in the environment of the nuclear power 
stations is the disaster Three miles island which happened at 4 am on 28th March 1979 and 
where the second nuclear reactor was partially melted. The operational building was 
contaminated and an extensive leakage of radioactivity to the environment also occurred. 
The investigation commission later designated for the reason of the accident a breakdown of 
the safety valve. The proportion of the human factor was that operators were unable to 
diagnose or respond properly to the unplanned automatic shutdown of the reactor. 
Deficient control room instrumentation and inadequate emergency response training 
proved to be root causes of the accident. 
Last example is connected to another type of accident - nearly accident. As an example we 
can introduce the Apollo 13 programme.  Its objective was the third landing of the human 
crew on the Moon surface, this time in the area of Fra Mauro. The typical sentence: 
“Houston, we’ve had a problem,” says how very close the crew was to a disaster. During 
the flight one of the oxygen tanks exploded and seriously damaged the service module. 
The consequences of this explosion were serious. Not only this situation caused the crew 
did not fulfill the task of this flight but it threatened the lives of the crew members.  The 
Manned Spacecraft Centre (today Lyndon B. Johnson Centre) had to develop with an 
extreme effort emergency scenarios thanks to which they succeeded in transporting the 
crew alive back to the Earth. Hundred of people were involved in the rescue: off – duty 
controllers, astronauts, simulation technicians, contractors’ personnel and many more. But 
this case is only to show how the team effort, and a magnificent display or sheer 
unadulterated professionalism, both in he spacecraft and on the ground brought the crew 
to the Earth alive. (Reason, 2010)  
There is a stark contrast between unsafe acts and these intrepid recoveries. Errors and 
violations are commonplace, banal ever, they are as much as a part of human condition as 
another ordinary human activities. Successful recoveries, on the other hand, are singular 
and remarkable events.  
The human factor in relation to the rise and demonstrations of the industrial accidents can 
play several roles. These roles are as follows: 
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 the human factor as the cause of the rise of the industrial accidents (hazard - human error), 
 the human factor as the recipient of the negative consequences of the industrial 
accidents (victim - negative impact), 
 the human factor as a hero or anticrisis factor (hero - heroic recoveries). 
Human factor as the cause of the rise of industrial accidents 
When the human factor fails, there is a whole chain of small errors which if occurred 
individually they would not have fatal consequences. However, from a certain point on the 
tragedy is unavoidable.  
There are several definitions of the human error. One of them says that the error is an action 
or a decision which was not determined (planned) and which leads to undesirable result. 
Furthermore, the human error defines a certain fact, statement or decision which deviates 
from the standard and the result is an actual or potential unfavourable event.  However, this 
event can but also need not lead to an unfavourable result.  
There are several possible definitions and there are also many ways in which errors can be 
classified. When we are talking about deviations concerning the human error we should 
mention such deviations that could be from upright (trip or stumble), from the current 
intention (slip or lapse), from an appropriate route towards some goal (mistake), or in some 
circles, it could even involve straying from the path of righteousness (sin).Human error 
classification should be done based on possible generic classification based on action: 
omission, intrusions, repetitions, wrong objects, disordering, mistiming, blends etc. 
In the industrial processes there are the following possible causes of errors and failure of the 
human factor: bad reflection of risks of the attendants; errors in communications; 
insufficient or incorrect knowledgeability of the employees, insufficient qualification, 
insufficient experience (lack of training) – practice, personality and health assumptions of 
the employees; failing to keep the working procedure; unsuitable working conditions and 
working environment; inattentiveness (momentary) of the employees and many others. 
(Malý, 2002) 
Human factor as hero (intrepid recoveries) 
Another perspective according to human factor, one that has been relatively little studied in 
its own right is human factor as a hero. This presents a human factor as an element whose 
adaptation and compensation have brought trouble systems back from the brink of disaster 
on a significant number of occasions. We have already presented an example Apollo 13 
where human factor saved several lives of astronaut. Other examples to be mentioned 
concerned to intrepid recoveries are connected to aeroplane crashes for example British 
airways flight 09 from London Heathrow to Aucland then BAC 1 – 11 flight to Malaga and 
many others. 
Reason (2010) presents:” I find the heroic recoveries of much greater interest and in the long 
run, potentially more beneficial to the pursuit of improved safety in dangerous situations 
(operations).” 
Human factor as recipient of negative consequences of industrial disasters 
As already mentioned people are in many cases the reason for rising industrial accidents 
and they also significantly affect their development. However, on the other hand people are 
also affected by them, tangibly by their negative consequences. The accidents affect the 
people – their lives, health, property but also the environment in dependence on the 
concrete form of the accident. The impacts on people can be divided into two groups, 
www.intechopen.com
 
Risk Assessment in Accident Prevention Considering Uncertainty and Human Factor Influence 
 
425 
namely the impacts on the employees working in the company and impacts on the non-
employees (the general public). The impacts of the industrial disasters on the employees 
according to their levels can be: death of the employee; serious damage of health with 
permanent consequences; serious industrial accident; light industrial accident; dangerous 
event (almost an accident); stress resulting from the situation arisen. (Zanicka Holla et.al, 
2010) 
Several scientific disciplines participate in solving the area of the human factor. They are 
especially disciplines as psychology, ergonomics, physiology, cybernetics, anthropology, 
hygiene, medicine, sociology and others. The human being as part of the working system is 
the most flexible, adaptable and valuable element, however, the most predisposed to making 
errors. An important role of the scientific disciplines which deal with the area of the human 
factor is to solve practical tasks in the real life, to increase the security, effectiveness and work 
comfort.  
There is nothing in the people’s history that would have prepared the human being for 
mastering the environment of the most modern technique, although we have adapted this 
technique to our capabilities and limitations. However, the technique is not sufficiently 
adapted to our psychical properties. In the field of the crisis management the area of the 
human factor is a cross-sectional area and therefore it is necessary to pay it increased 
attention.   
5. Conclusion 
The object of this article was the area of preventing the industrial accidents with an 
emphasis on the process of the industrial processes risk assessment, the influence of 
uncertainty on the results of the realised analysis and last but not least the position of the 
human factor in the process of the rise and operation of the industrial disasters´ effects. In 
Europe for the time being there are discussions concerning the utilisation of the same 
procedures, methods and techniques in the area of preventing the industrial disasters by the 
member states. This unification can bring positives but also negatives. One of the positives is 
the possibility to compare the results among individual companies and in this way to assess 
the level of their danger in the European context; however, this would be only possible in 
the area of serious industrial disasters, i.e. for the companies controlled by the SEVESO II 
Directive. The systematic procedure ARAMIS has been created and it is to serve these 
purposes, however, only a few countries are making use of it. The EU requirement also 
heads to utilising especially the quantitative approaches in regard to reducing the 
uncertainty rate in the analyses.  
A problem could be also the variance of approaches used by individual countries, selecting 
the probabilistic or deterministic approach of stating the risk, the a priori or a posteriori 
approach, the qualitative, semi-qualitative approach. The selection of the procedure 
depends especially on the size of the company assessed, the pre-disposition of the 
employees (the educational and personality one) who carry out these analyses, the financial 
possibilities of the company or institutions and many others.  
In my opinion the common approach which will work on the quantitative calculations can 
be selected only for the so called SEVESO companies which are monitored by the EU and 
have to work out these analyses based on the legal requirements. For other companies (but 
for the SEVESO firms as well) it is possible to state at least a structured approach. The 
structured approach should state how it is to proceed when assessing the risks phase by 
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phase and subsequently step by step in the framework of the individual phases. The auditor 
would choose the individual methods based on the criteria for the risk assessment. The 
utilised methods should be, in my opinion, at least semi-quantitative and of course, the 
quantitative methods should be preferred.  
Another challenge for solving this area is to create a risk matrix which would be able to 
compare the quantitative expression of the risk components of several objects (loss of life, 
damaging health, damaging property, and environment). In such a case we would come to 
the issue of calculating the price of the human life by financial means which is today 
considered as non-ethical and impossible by many experts. Another problem is the presence 
of uncertainty in the risk analysis which causes deviations in the analysis results. It is 
necessary to identify the critical places in the analysis for the influence of uncertainty to be 
reduced as much as possible. In the Slovak Republic we are missing the investigation of 
uncertainty and due to this fact research and searching for critical places of uncertainty 
specific for Slovakia due to several differences compared with other countries in this region 
could be realised.  
However, we must not forget that the human factor is the weakest segment in this process. 
According to several investigations and analyses the human factor is the most frequent 
cause of the rise of the industrial disasters. The analysis of the human reliability should 
create an integral part of the risk assessment. It would be suitable to create a methodological 
instruction for processing the analysis of the human factor reliability which is missing in 
Slovakia for the time being. Creating some space for a further investigation in the area of the 
human factor I see especially in researching the specifics of surviving and behaving the 
human factor (personality) in three positions identified.  
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